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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DAWN W. HORNE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 20187

W. REID HORNE,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
May the trial court, pursuant to settlement of an action
regarding division of marital property, and in order to avoid
application of newly enacted federal tax law, enter nunc pro
tunc to the date of the settlement agreement an order of distribution of property reflecting substantive changes in the
terms of the agreement?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (Supp. 1983):
Authority of Court. A court having jurisdiction
may, upon its finding of good cause and giving of such
notice as may be ordered, enter an order Nunc Pro Tunc
in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, legal
separation or annulment of marriage.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the trial court's entry nunc pro
tunc of an order of distribution of property incident to a
previously granted divorce.
Course of Proceedings
This is a bifurcated divorce action in which the parties
were divorced on January 27, 1984, with division of the
parties1 property reserved for later determination.

On

June 20, 1984, following the first two days of the trial of the
property aspects of the case, the parties entered into an oral
property settlement on the record.

A dispute arose over the

tax consequences of the agreement, and on August 17, 1984, the
district court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and its Order of Distribution of Real and Personal
Property, Payment of Debts, Support, Attorney's Fees and Other
Related Matters in which all reference to taxability had been
stricken, and in which the court, by interlineation, had made
substantive changes in other terms of the agreement.

Copies of

those documents are attached in the addendum hereto.
Disposition in the Court Below
Over objection of defendant, the court, on August 17, 1984,
entered its order of property division nunc pro tunc to
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June 20, 1984 in order to avoid a change in the tax laws which
became effective July 18, 1984.
Facts
This case involves the propriety of entry of an order nunc
pro tunc for the purposes of avoiding the substantive effect of
changes in federal tax laws.

Plaintiff Dawn W. Home and

defendant W. Reid Home were marriect on January 17, 1970.
138.)

Plaintiff filed for divorce on February 19, 1980.

2-3.)

The district court ordered the divorce and property

settlement issues in the proceeding bifurcated.
1984, the parties were divorced.

(R.
(R.

On January 27,

(R. 141-42.)

Defendant brought substantial premarital property into the
marriage, ana the parties accumulated substantial property
during the marriage.

The identification of marital property

was a central issue at trial.

Trial of the division of prop-

erty portion of the case began on June 19, 1984 and was
scheduled to run four days.

(R. 185.)

On the second day of

trial, after the plaintiff had testified, the parties reached a
settlement agreement.

The settlement agreement was read into

the record that afternoon in the presence of the parties, their
counsel ana the court.

(Tr. of Proceedings, June 20, 1984.)

The settlement agreement, as read into the record, provided
a method of division of that portion of the parties1 property
which was agreed to be marital property.
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(^Id.) The major

terms of the agreement consisted of division of a number of
parcels of real property.

{Id.,

pp. 2-6.)

Other terms of the

agreement dealt with the division of bank accounts, miscellaneous assets, and personal effects.

(J[d. , pp. 8-11.)

The court

indicated its approval of the agreement and ordered plaintiff's
counsel to prepare an appropriate order.

(Id_. , p. 12.)

The subsequent dispute over the terms of the agreement can
only be understood with reference to federal tax law.

Prior to

July 18, 1984, taxation of marital property settlements
depended on the terms of the court's order or the parties'
agreement.

In United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), the

United States Supreme Court held that a transfer of marital
property incident to divorce was a sale or exchange, and thus a
taxable event.

370 U.S. at 71. The effect of treating the

division as a taxable event was to impose upon the transferring
party (in this case, the defendant) tax liability for capital
gains on the property up to the date of transfer, and to provide the recipient party (in this case, the plaintiff) with a
stepped-up basis in the property reflecting its value as of the
date of the transfer.

See I.R.C. § 1001.

In several revenue rulings since the Davis case, the Internal Revenue Service delineated a now well-recognized exception
to the Davis rule.

That exception provided that, if the trans-

action was an attempt to equally divide marital assets, there
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was no taxable event within the meaning of Davis.

See Rev.

Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26; Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B.
158.

The theory behind the exception was that, in an approxi-

mately equal division of marital assets, the transaction consisted merely of each spouse retaining his or her own property,
and thus, there was no sale, exchange or other disposition of
property to constitute a taxable event.

The parties1 dispute

over the terms to be included in the order in the case at bar
related to whether the agreement constituted a division of
marital assets or simply a transfer of property, and thus,
whether the exception to the Davis rule was applicable.
Effective as of July 18, 1984, the Tax Reform Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-369, did away with the controversy surrounding
United States v. Davis by overruling the holding in Davis. The
Tax Reform Act provides that no gain or loss will be recognized
to the transferor in the case of transfers of property between
spouses or former spouses incident to a divorce.

Further, the

Act provides that the basis of the property transferred in the
hands of the transferor spouse will carry over and become the
basis of the property in the hands of the transferee.

Act

§ 421, adding I.R.C. § 1041 and amending I.R.C. §§ 1015 and
1239.
At the settlement conference in the instant case on
June 20, 1964, the court indicated that it would approve the
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agreement and requested that Mr. Liapis prepare an appropriate
order.

Mr. Liapis prepared and submitted an order to defen-

dant's counsel for approval as to form.

(See R. 218-19.)

Defendant voiced an objection that the proposed order failed to
provide that the agreement constituted an attempt to equalize
the marital assets of the parties, which language would have
substantially effected the tax consequences of the agreement.
(See R. 219-20.)

While the parties were negotiating over the

terms of the agreement, the President signed the Tax Reform
Act, rendering the dispute over the terms of the proposed order
moot.

Because of the change in the tax law, plaintiff moved

that the order, as proposed by her counsel, be entered nunc pro
tunc as of June 20, 1984.

(R. 218-21.)

Further, after the entry of the stipulation on the record,
and during negotiation over the terms of the agreement, a dispute arose between plaintiff and her counsel, in which plaintiff alleged various acts of misconduct, including excessive
billing, sexual harassment and negligence.
Proceedings, Aug. 8, 1984, pp. 7, 64.)

(See R. 210; Tr. of

Plaintiff's present

counsel, Mr. Wade, therefore entered an appearance.

(R. 205.)

A hearing was set on August 8, 1984, to resolve the charges of
misconduct, the necessary leave of court for appearance of new
counsel, the dispute over the language to be contained in the
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Preece v, Preece, 60J

A.

The court's oral announcement of its approval of

the terms of the agreement does not constitute a previously
made final order such as may be the basis for entry of a later
order nunc pro tunc.
B.

The dispute over the inclusion or exclusion of

tax language in the decree was substantive and had not been
resolved as of June 20, 1984; the court's later ruling regarding the tax issue therefore went beyond mere correction of the
record of events on June 20, 1984.
C.

The court substantively changed the terms of the

agreement regarding payment of attorneys' fees; that substantive change demonstrates that the court retained power to alter
the order and thus that the court's action on June 20, 1984 did
not constitute a final resolution of the matter in issue.
II.

The court's reliance in this case on the authority

granted it under Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (supp. 1983) was
misplaced.
A.

Section 30-4a-l was intended only to permit

courts to enter nunc pro tunc orders relating to the marital
status of the parties, and is not applicable to orders involving only the division of marital property.
B.

Section 30-4a-l does not expand the factual

circumstances, justifying entry of an order nunc pro tunc; a
previously made final ruling is still required.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
UNDER CONTROLLING UTAH CASE LAW, THE LOWER
COURT'S ENTRY OF THE ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC
WAS IMPROPER IN THAT THE ORDER INCORPORATED
SUBSTANTIVE RULINGS MADE AFTER THE COURT'S
INITIAL APPROVAL OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT.
Preece - , ireec - - <;P2 P. 2d 1. 9 b 'Utai 1984

*.' is ccjrt

considered the proper application

'u

i in• 111 d ivorce act ions :
A motion nunc pro tin ic is used to make the record
speak the truth; it may not be used to correct the
court's failure to speak. In other words, the function of a nunc pro tunc is not to make an order now
for then, but to enter now for then an order previously made.
^:t-^.-'iv
*-rL, ju.-.u*i.\j :.._*

i t it •
•

of divorce ana st: fortn tru terms ;
de.i^.-

: -

-• '

. Preece, the trial
;r :l-i 'ira^r a decree
, > i.iv.'xuv:-.j

ne wxi^'o counsel submitted proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law to the husband's counsel, who in turn asked the court to strike a paragraph awarding
attorneys' fees to the wife.

There was no formal motion madef

however, and the husband's counsel deferred decision to the
trial court.

Prior to the court's signing of the decree, the

husband died of a heart attack.

In order to establish that the

wife was not entitled to a portion of the husband's estate, the
trial court entered the decree nunc pro tunc as of the trial
date.

This court held the lower court's action to be improper

despite the seemingly harsh result.
In reaching its conclusion in Preece, this court held that
the order could only be entered nunc pro tunc to the date of
trial if there was a final resolution of the matter as of the
date of trial.

The court held nunc pro tunc to be improper,

reasoning that, until the decree was signed, the trial court
retained the ability to alter the terms of the decree, which
indicated that the order was more than a reflection of a
previously made ruling:
The determinative factor which prevents the use of
nunc pro tunc in the instant case is the lack of
signature on a decree and the attendant ability of the
court to alter the terms of the decree until it was
signed and entered. Additionally, the dispute over
the substantive issue of attorney fees (in spite of
respondent's counsel's indication that he would leave
its resolution to the trial court) points to a lack of
finality. Because the judge's oral announcement was
not reduced to a signed written decree prior to the
death of Mr. Preece, a previously made order did not
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h e r e . A nunc p r o tunc order should be the r e f l e c t i o n
of a p r e v i o u s l y m a d e r u l i n g . T h e c o u r t had orally
a n n o u n c e d that the d e c r e e w a s "to become final upon
s i g n i n g . " B y m a k i n g it e f f e c t i v e as of t h e trial date
rather than upon s i g n i n g , t h e court altered its p r e v i ous ruling.
It did n o t m e r e l y reflect i t s p r e v i o u s
ruling.
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the parties' agreement as to payment of attorneys' fees was
that $20,000 of the $25,000 cash settlement provided in the
agreement was for attorneys' fees.

(R. 245.)

Despite the

parties' agreement that the $20,000 was paid as attorneys'
fees, the court altered the findings to provide that each party
was to pay his or her own attorneys' fees.

(June 20, 1984 tr.

p. 11.)
L.
Defendant should be ordered to pay to plaintiff, and has done so in open court, the sum of
$5,000, the same to include the June s-tj^pe-F* alimony
payment due under the temporary Order.
M.
Defendant should be ordered to pay to plaintiff on or before the second day of July, 1984, the
sum of $15,000 and an additional sum of $5,000 in six
(6) months or on or before the 21st day of December,
19 8 4 r -a s- -a*ni -&Q-S- -pia-i-fl-kirf-f- -& -a-fe. We-r+e-y- -s- -£^e»& -aftd
Gos-t-s-. Aft-y- a<i<ii-tio«-a4: Each party is to pay a t t o r n e y s
fees and other p r o f e s s i o n a l fees incurred by either of
the parties^ &kauJ^4^-*ts»unia<i^^
&wih-GA&t.

(R.

271.)

Plainly, the court made substantive changes to the provision
regarding attorneys' fees, and such substantive changes also
preclude the application of nunc pro tunc under the rule
announced in Preece.
Finally, no order or judgment was entered on June 20,
1984.

Despite the recitation in the decree that it was to be

entered "nunc pro tunc to be of record as of June 20, 1984,
that being the date when the judgment was rendered herein," no
judgment was in fact rendered on June 20th.

Rather, under the

Preece rule, the oral announcement of the court's approval does

-12-

not constitj'p ^ rr^"iojs order because of the count's retention ^
F.2d

t: -

^,;> .

...
'-

.

;^

entry

c:

.

' nuqj^'

«iu, ± b (• t * ...
cujrt-'s

.

• ' • ir-

:.

,..-.

,.:,:;: ^ecisio-

'

. J<_ J r. "

viii.ojt

las;-

;

."

82
-

i i.

* ot

' .• c

reverses.

POINT 11
THE LOWER COURT'S ENTRY OF ITS ORDER OF
PROPERTY DIVISION NUNC PRO TUNC WENT BEYOND
THE SCOPE OF ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY.
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subsequently remarry.

As Senator Carling explained the bill to

the Senate on February 10, 1983:
Right now, if a court order is entered, the date that
that order is entered determines all of the procedures
in the case. In a divorce case, if the papers are
held up in the clerk's office for some reason and they
don't get to the judge and are signed on a particular
date it might create problems in a marriage because if
the marriage is not final by the time another party
gets married the second marriage would be void, and it
might just be because of a clerical mistake.
In presenting the bill to the House, its sponsor, Rep.
Lorin Pace, gave several examples of situations to which the
statute would be applicable.

Each of those examples involved

the marital status of the parties:
Let me give you two examples. A number of years ago,
a man and wife obtained a divorce, and after the
divorce had been obtained, they went back into one of
the attorneys involved and talked to the attorney
about setting the divorce decree aside, something
which can be done by a mere petition within 90 days
after the entry of most divorce decrees. The attorney
didn't understand clearly that he was supposed to do
that, thought that they were still discussing that, so
he did nothing. And the man and woman went back out
thinking their divorce had been set aside. Ten years
later the man died and the woman, in seeking to handle
the problems of the estate, found out for the last ten
years she had been living in sin and had not been
married. Well, upon application to the court, the
court could enter upon a finding that they had indeed
thought they were having that divorce decree set
aside, the court could enter a decree nunc pro tunc
saying the decree entered today takes effect ten years
ago and in effect re-establishes the marriage on that
date.
Tr. of 3rd Reading of House Bill 218, Jan. 27, 1983, comments
of Rep. Lorin Pace.
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case simply backdated its order.

The instant case falls out-

side the scope of factual circumstances justifying invocation
of the nunc pro tunc power and thus, the statutory provision
regarding nunc pro tunc orders is inapposite.
Finally, the statute authorizes nunc pro tunc only upon a
finding of good cause.

The district court in the instant case

found good cause as follows:
The Court finds that with the recent unexpected
change in the tax laws that good cause exists to grant
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Order Nunc Pro Tunc as of
June 20, 1984. (R. 274 if 5.)
Regardless of whether the statute otherwise applies, and
even if the change in the tax laws can be characterized as
"unexpected" (the Tax Reform Act contained the provision overruling United States v. Davis when first introduced in the
House on October 20, 1983, s«ee H. R. Rep. No. 98-432, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1983)), a change in tax laws cannot constitute good cause for entry of an order nunc pro tunc.

Under

this court's ruling in Preece, good cause for nunc pro tunc
exists only to correct a clerical error or omission, and not to
make substantive changes in the rights and obligations of the
parties.

682 P.2d at 299.

Further, this court has held that

the nunc pro tunc device cannot be used to revive the time for
taking a required step in a legal proceeding after the
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urge the motion about entry of the order ni inc pro tunc.
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Mr. Wade: We are willing to do that. We've
already discussed it and that's exactly what we are
willing to do. If they win the nunc pro tunc, then we
have accomplished everything we wanted. If they lose
the nunc pro tunc, then that's when we want to step in.
The Court;

Is that agreeable, Mrs. Home?

Mrs. Home:

Yes, it is.

Mr. Crandall: I don't want to get in a position
where a ruling in favor of the nunc pro tunc is going
to resolve an otherwise sticky problem. I think
that's unfair to me because I don't think they're
entitled to a nunc pro tunc order.
The Court: We haven't got that far yet.
1984 tr. pp. 32-33.)

(Aug 8,

While the court later stated that the ruling "was not a
package deal" (Tr. 34), a fair reading of the entire transcript
demonstrates that the court in fact traded the nunc pro tunc
order for abandonment of the misconduct motion:
The Court: The Court's order will be that I'll
enter the findings, conclusion and decree without
regard to any tax language at all, simply a division
of the assets nunc pro tunc to June 20, 1984.
Mr. Liapis: Thank you.
Mr. Gustin:
filed?
The Court:

We'll strike the pleading that was
Do you object to its being stricken?

Mr. Wade: No objection.
landed in the court's file.
The Court:
original?
Mr. Wade:

It probably hasn't even

Any objection to me turning over the
No.

(Aug. 8, 1984 tr. p. 64.)
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In appropriate circumstances, a court might well adopt an
agreement by the parties to grant one motion in exchange for
settlement of some other pending motion.

In the instant case,

however, the court traded a right of the defendant in exchange
for a benefit flowing to a third person and not involving a
claim by the defendant.

Such action on the part of the court

was highly improper and compels reversal of the court's granting of the motion to enter its order nunc pro tunc.
CONCLUSION
The district court's attempt to avoid the substantive
application of a change in tax law by entry of its decree in
this case nunc pro tunc was improper.

Therefore, that portion

of the court's order which compels nunc pro tunc application
must be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~?fc day of December, 1984.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

BY

KL WW
Rodney R. \Pariker
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ADDENDUM
1.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

2.
Order of Distribution of Real and Personal Property,
Payment of Debts, Support/ Attorney's Fees and Other Related
Matters.
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PAUL H. LIAPIS
ARNOLD RICHER
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 532-6996
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

i

ooOoo
DAWN W. HORNE,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
v.
W. REID HORNE,

Civil No. D 80-668

Defendant.

Judge Rigtrup
ooOoo

This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 19th
and 20th days of June, 1984, before the Honorable Kenneth
Rigtrup, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court,
Plaintiff, DAWN W. HORNE, appearing in person and by and through
her attorneys, Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer, and Defendant,
W. REID HORNE, appearing in person and by and through his
attorney, Richard K. Crandall, and the Court having taken
testimony and during the second day of trial having been advised
by counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant that the parties had
reached a verbal stipulation and agreement, and said agreement
having been read into the record in the presence of Plaintiff and

Defendant, and Plaintiff and Defendant having confirmed said
agreement, and Defendant having agreed to withdraw his pleadings,
and the Court having already entered the Decree of Divorce on the
27th day of January, 1984, and the matter having been returned to
the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order
of Distribution Nunc Pro Tunc and the Court having reviewed the
records and files herein and being fully advised in the premises,
and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer, attorneys
for Plaintiff, does now make, adopt and find the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff was a bona fide and actual resident of Salt

Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months
immediately prior to the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint in this
matter.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having

been married on January 17, 1970, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and
having separated in May of 1981.
3.

No children have been born as issue of this marriage,

and none are expected.
4.

The Court finds that the parties have entered into a

verbal stipulation and property settlement agreement, which was
read into the record in the presence of all parties, concerning
the division of the property of the parties, payment of gi.ipriarr
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and debts and other related matters, which the Court now finds to
be fair and equitable:
A.

Plaintiff should be awarded the following parcels

of real property:
(1)

The Old Farm condominium located at 691 East

4181 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and
separate property, free and clear of any interest of
the Defendant.

Plaintiff should assume and pay the

mortgage, property taxes and insurance payments
thereon.
(2)

The duplex located at 1923-25 East 1700

South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate
property, free and clear of any interest of the
Defendant, together with all appliances, furniture and
fixtures situated therein and all income received
therefrom.

Plaintiff should assume and pay the

mortgage, property taxes and insurance payments
thereon.
(3)

The duplex located at 1935-37 East 1700

South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate
property, free and clear of any interest of the
Defendant, together with all income, appliances,
furniture and fixtures situated therein.

Plaintiff

should assume and pay the mortgage, property taxes and
insurance payments thereon.
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(4)

The Townhouse Court Apartments, containing

1.18 acres, located at 3160 South 200 East, Salt Lake
City, Utah, together with all fixtures, appliances,
current and prepaid rentals, deposits, ledger books,
financial records, the reserve and escrow accounts,

M:..,
a.ng Miii m w uf ?2j647.73 lcpiaBLiiLing the mrani-gG
mrrriiiiij In hrinnfthr rirrny ^^jwurif mrrrnt , nn shrwi
<orx>hr» Ml Ml'Tied Prudohfeial'" Fodornl Snv jingo and Loan
->

yiiliiHj nwixinBTH"Plaiirtt4f £'s Euhibife 1'*, attached

a^iimnLi i ^H .uiiPffM .Umnry

r; i.U£ ,vr and other items

directly associated with this property.

Plaintiff

should assume and pay the only mortgage payment upon
this property to Prudential Federal Savings as of July,
1984, with a balance of approximately $297,000.00, and
should assume and pay the property taxes for the year
1984.

Plaintiff should hold the Defendant harmless

from the mortgage as of July 1, 1984, and all property
tax obligations for the year 1984.

Defendant should be

responsible for mi& payments on the mortgage for the

A*.
m o n t h s p r i o r t o J u l y 1 , 1 9 8 4 , i n c l u d i n g r * h**<i jnyl
1
- Hay'. fiiT*"of" jt"i""*
"M M . 1li'"l,
e
cl ihmairi gt rer sl } ^tfijThet 1'V
transfer
h i s property
shouldl a tbe

effective July 1, 1984, onti tho above lata chargeg nnrt
ckii'L

fundi; Uhwuld be paid by" th»i: dato«
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(5)

The vacant lot containing 1.52 acres located

at 6716 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, free and
clear of any encumbrances thereon.

Plaintiff should

assume and pay the property taxes for the year 1984*
f^'MiiiJ Llm DUfmidauL • a h o u l < K ^ ^ " ^ r *n rn*jnHf* rmifriJ-ii"
nmyrvfeq xndt may ha*a boon c3Lablishcd»for thig
propcgfeyfr but DiiilunQauL rcpieacrils no mieh aecountgr'»or
rps^AUiiL "UJ.ibt^ ' 'iElig Guui-4-"lindrf that no mortgage or
other obligation presently exists on such property.
B.

Defendant should be awarded the following parcels

of real property:
(1)

The Suzy Q apartment complex located at 644

South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, containing .34
acre, with a mortgage to Prudential Federal Savings in
the approximate present balance of $53,300.00, together
with all fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits,
reserves and other such associated assets therein.
Defendant should assume and pay all mortgages, taxes
and other debts against said property and hold the
Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(2)

The 5-plex located at 528 Elm Avenue, Salt

Lake City, Utah, with no mortgage obligation existing
against the same, together with all of the fixtures and
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other
associated assets therein.
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Defendant should assume and

pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(3)

The Townhouse Villa apartment complex located

at 3570 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah,
containing 2.64 acres of land, with a mortgage balance
to Prudential Federal Savings of approximately
$504,709.74, together with all of the fixtures and
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other
associated assets therein.

Defendant should assume and

pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(4)

The Townhouse II apartment complex located at

2250 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a
mortgage balance to Prudential Federal Savings of
approximately $922,687.00, the same being a limited
partnership with W. Reid H o m e and David H o m e in which
the Defendant owns 57.5% interest, together with all of
the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits,
reserves and other associated assets therein.
Defendant should assume and pay all mortgages, taxes
and other debts against said property and hold the
Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(5)

The office warehouse complex located at 547

West 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a mortgage
balance to Prudential Federal Savings of approximately
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$199,918.00, together with all of the fixtures and
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other
associated assets therein.

Defendant should assume and

pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(6)

The rental properties at 62 and 72 Edison

Street, Murray, Utah, together with all of the fixtures
and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other
associated assets therein.

Defendant should assume and

pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against -said
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(7)

Lot 76, Bloomington Country Club #7, St.

George, Utah, subject to the Defendant assuming and
paying any taxes or other obligations owing thereon and
holding the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
(8)

Unit 38 - 414, Snowbird Iron Blossom Time

Share interest, with the Defendant to assume and pay
any debts and obligations outstanding and owing against
said interest and to hold the Plaintiff harmless
therefrom.
(9)

The two condominiums located at 7833 and 7839

Honeywood Cove, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with all
of the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits,
reserves and other associated assets therein.
Defendant should assume and pay all mortgages, taxes
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and other debts against said property and hold the
Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
C.

Plaintiff should further be awarded the contract

receivable for $160,000.00, together with all interest due
and owing thereon, and the monthly payments of approximately
$2,000.00 per month, all associated with the Defendant's
recent sale of the property located at 4400 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.

Defendant should cause the

conveyance to Plaintiff of all right, title and interest in
and to said contract and contract receivable with said
conveyance to be effective on the 1st day of July, 1984.
D.

Defendant should be awarded as his sole and

separate property the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and
appliances presently in his possession and under his
control, his bank accounts and savings accounts, the 33,000
shares of Challenge Corporation stock, and his personal
effects and belongings, including his grandfather's sword.
E.

Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and

separate property all the furniture, furnishings, fixtures
and appliances presently in her possession and under her
control, the 1981 Toyota Cressida automobile, her bank
accounts and savings accounts and other such accounts, and
her personal effects and belongings.
F.

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant should be awarded

any alimony from the other.
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G.

Defendant should be ordered and required to secure

and maintain at normal and reasonable rates a $100,000.00
term life insurance policy on his life, with the Plaintiff
as owner and with the Plaintiff named as primary, sole and
exclusive beneficiary thereon.

Defendant should forthwith

obtain said policy in the name of Plaintiff, deliver said
policy to her and make all premium payments thereon.
H.

Plaintiff should be required to assume and pay and

hold the Defendant harmless therefrom the following
obligations:

The only mortgage payment on the Townhouse

Court Apartments to Prudential Federal Savings, the mortgage
payment on Plaintiff's condominium to Prudential Federal
Savings, the mortgage payment on the two duplexes awarded
Plaintiff to MountainWest Savings and Loan, the property
taxes on the above condominium, duplexes, Townhouse Court
and lot at 6716 South 1300 East, all in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, and any debts she has incurred in her own
name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter,-ov r « W ^ ^ I.

Defendant should be required to assume and pay and

hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom the following
obligations:

All debts and obligations incurred by the

parties during the course of the marriage/, all debts
associated with those real properties awarded to the
Defendant, all obligations that may result from joint tax
return filings of the parties, and 'any debts and obligations
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he has incurred in his own name since the filing of the
Complaint in this matter.
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L.

Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff,

and has done so in open Court, the sum of $5,000.00, the
same to include the June aj*fudta*<t payment due under the
Temporary Order.
M.

Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff on

or before the 2nd day of July, 1984, the sum of $15,000.00
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or before the 21st day of December, 1984, JLJ iwfd f §i
S«L£

fink

A> *fZ <p*£ MtZ+fyfa*«c»

P3.aiuLirf' J uLfeornoy'r foog nnri rnefcoyftriy*additional- fees
incurred by either of the parties, ohouicl be1
jqrfXuAftf*11 i i in j i in 11
N.

Defendant should cooperate in obtaining a Toyota

automobile or automobiles for Plaintiff at the dealer's
wholesale price through the automobile dealerships owned by
Larry H. Miller.

The CourL finda that Plaintiff should have
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P.

Defendant should be ordered to replace the roof on

the duplex at 1933-37 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
at his sole cost and expense.

Said work is to be done by

the Defendant's work crew and at the sole cost of the
Defendant and is to be completed within sixty (60) days of
the signing of this order.
Q.

The parties should each be mutually enjoined and

restrained from harassing, annoying, bothering or harming
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one another in any way and at any time, with the sole
exception that they are allowed to contact one another to
complete the requirements and the transfer of properties,
payment of debts, repairs and other items as made necessary
by this order.
R.

Defendant should be awarded all right, title and

interest he holds in and to the W.R.H. Construction Company,
together with all assets and liabilities associated
therewith, with the same to be free and clear of any
interest of the Plaintiff.
S.

Defendant should further be granted a right of

first refusal should the Plaintiff ever place any of the
above properties, excluding the Old Farm condominium,
awarded to her for sale, with said right to be exercised in
writing within three (3) business days of receipt of the
offer of purchase from the Plaintiff's prospective buyers.
T.

The parties should each be ordered to do and

perform all the matters and things required by each of them
to be done herein, and they should effectuate and carry
forth the agreement expressed herein.
U.

The parties further agree that all property,

assets and other items which have been acquired during this
marriage have been fully declared and distributed by this
Agreement and that no other assets or properties exist.
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5.

The Court finds that with the recent unexpected change

in the tax laws that good cause exists to grant Plaintiff's
Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and Order Nunc Pro Tunc as of June 20, 1984. The court further
finds that the Defendant was given proper notice of such Motion.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
adopts its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The verbal stipulation and property settlement

agreement presented to the Court and more fully reflected in the
foregoing Findings of Fact, concerning division of the property
of the parties, payment of support, payment of the debts and
obligations of the parties, and other matters, as more
specifically set forth above, should be ratified, approved and
confirmed in all particulars, and the same is to be embodied into
the Order of Distribution of Real and Personal Property, Payment
of Debts, Support, Attorney's Fees and Other Related Matters to
be entered herein.
2.

It is hereby ordered that the final judgment of divorce

which has this day been signed by the Court be filed and entered
Nunc Pro Tunc to be of record as of June 20, 1984, that being the
date when the judgment could have been signed, dated, filed and
entered.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
That judgment be entered accordingly.

13

DATED this

f0 "day of August, 1984.
BY THE COURT

tENHETH RIGTRl
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

N. D/XQA?';.;

RICHARD K. CRANDALL
Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was handdelivered to Richard K. Crandall, Esq., 10 Exchange Place, 11th
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah

84110, this /£) ""day of August,

1984.
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AUG 1 7 ?984

PAUL H. LIAPIS
ARNOLD RICHER
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Third Floor, New York Building
48 Post Office Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 532-6996

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ORDER OF DISTRIBUTION OF
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY,
PAYMENT OF DEBTS, SUPPORT,
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND OTHER
RELATED MATTERS

DAWN W. HORNE,
Plaintiff,
v.
W. REID HORNE,

Civil No. D 80-668

Defendant.

Judge Rigtrup
ooOoo

This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 19th
and 20th days of June, 1984, before the Honorable Kenneth
Rigtrup, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court,
Plaintiff, DAWN W. HORNE, appearing in person and by and through
her attorneys, Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer, and Defendant,
W. REID HORNE, appearing in person and by and through his
attorney, Richard K. Crandall, and the Court having taken
testimony and during the second day of trial having been advised
by counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant that the parties had
reached a verbal stipulation and agreement, and said agreement
having been read into the record in the -presence of Plaintiff and

Defendant, and Plaintiff and Defendant having confirmed said
agreement, and Defendant having agreed to withdraw his pleadings,
and the Court having already entered the Decree of Divorce on the
27th day of January, 1984, and the matter having been returned to
the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Plaintiff's Motion to
Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order
of Distribution Nunc Pro Tunc, and the Court having made and
entered herein its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer of
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS, attorneys for Plaintiff:
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
as follows:
1.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the following

parcels of real property:
A,

The Old Farm condominium located at 691 East 4181

South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate
property, free and clear of any interest of the Defendant.
Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the mortgage,
property taxes and insurance payments thereon.
B.

The duplex located at 1923-25 East 1700 South,

Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate property,
free and clear of any interest of the Defendant, together
with all appliances, furniture and fixtures situated therein
and all income received therefrom.
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Plaintiff is ordered to

assume and pay the mortgage, property taxes and insurance
payments thereon.
C.

The duplex located at 1935-37 East 1700 South,

Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate property,
free and clear of any interest of the Defendant, together
with all appliances, furniture and fixtures situated therein
and all income received therefrom.

Plaintiff is ordered to

assume and pay all mortgage, property taxes and insurance
payments thereon.
D.

The Townhouse Court Apartments, containing 1.18

acres, located at 3160 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah,
together with all fixtures, appliances, current and prepaid
rentals, deposits, ledger books, financial records, the
reserve and escrow accounts, tn-lnflinj Ih
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items directly associated with this property.
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other

Plaintiff is

ordered to assume and pay the only mortgage payment against
said property to Prudential Federal Savings on said
property, commencing July, 1984, with a balance of
approximately $297,000.00, and shall assume and pay the
property taxes for the year 1984. Defendant shall be

3

responsible for -«*t payments on the mortgage for the months
prior to July, 1984, including, but mot Aimifeodfee-,Lhe May,
t-982 and KtHr^kr- I?9», late charges,7 The transfer of this # ^
property shall be effective July 1, 1984 # and the nbjsiwc lata
^ih^rfl^ nnri XC i n fin!
E.

• 1 • • 111 1

[ ul lij^thmtjpfU.ta

The vacant lot containing 1.52 acres located at

6716 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, free and clear
of any encumbrances thereon.

Plaintiff is ordered to assume

and pay the property taxes for the year 1984, and ithe
r^^nflnnt ^hnlil transferfr,nPI rrint i f f ,my tnn rmrrvri

that

may have b*yu-.ea£tab3 ishpd for this-psopertyj tout Defendant
rcprep^nWOi no suih-aicuuirfes on1 roGorvca cxtal.
2.

Defendant be and he is hereby awarded the following

parcels of real property:
A.

The Suzy Q apartment complex located at 644 South

800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, containing .34 acre, with a
mortgage to Prudential Federal Savings in the approximate
present balance of $53,300.00, together with all fixtures
and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other such
associated assets therein.

Defendant is ordered to assume

and pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
B.

The 5-plex located at 528 Elm Avenue, Salt Lake

City, Utah, with no mortgage obligation existing against the
same, together with all of the fixtures and appliances,
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rentals, deposits, reserves and other associated assets
therein.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all

mortgages, taxes and other debts against said property and
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
C.

The Townhouse Villa apartment complex located at

3570 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, containing 2.64
acres of land, with a mortgage balance to Prudential Federal
Savings of approximately $504,709.74, together with all of
the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and
other associated assets therein.

Defendant is ordered to

assume and pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against
said property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
D.

The Townhouse II apartment complex located at 2250

South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a mortgage
balance to Prudential Federal Savings of approximately
$922,687.00, the same being a limited partnership with W.
Reid Home and David Home in which the Defendant owns 57.5%
interest, together with all of the fixtures and appliances,
rentals, deposits, reserves and other associated assets
therein.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all

mortgages, taxes and other debts against said property and
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
E.

The office warehouse complex located at 547 West

3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a mortgage balance to
Prudential Federal Savings of approximately $199,918.00,
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together with all of the fixtures and appliances, rentals,
deposits, reserves and other associated assets therein.
Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all mortgages, taxes
and other debts against said property and hold the Plaintiff
harmless therefrom.
F.

The rental properties at 62 and 72 Edison Street,

Murray, Utah, together with all of the fixtures and
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other associated
assets therein.

Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all

mortgages, taxes and other debts against said property and
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
G.

Lot 76, Bloomington Country Club #7, St. George,

Utah, subject to the Defendant assuming and paying any taxes
or other obligations owing thereon and holding the Plaintiff
harmless therefrom.
H.

Unit 38 - 414, Snowbird Iron Blossom Time Share

interest, with the Defendant to assume and pay any debts and
obligations outstanding and owing against said interest.
I.

The two condominiums located at 7833 and 7839

Honeywood Cove, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with all of
the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and
other associated assets therein.

Defendant is ordered to

assume and pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against
said property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom.
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3.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the contract

receivable for $160,000.00, together with all interest due and
owing thereon, and the monthly payments of approximately
$2,000.00 per month, all associated with the Defendant's recent
sale of the property located at 4400 South State Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah.

Defendant be and he is further ordered to cause

the conveyance to Plaintiff of all right, title and interest in
and to said contract and contract receivable, with said
conveyance to be effective on the 1st day of July, 1984.
4.

Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his sole and

separate property the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and
appliances presently in his possession and under his control, his
bank accounts and savings accounts, the 33,000 shares of
Challenge Corporation stock, and his personal effects and
belongings, including his grandfather's sword.
5.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her sole and

separate property all the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and
appliances presently in her possession and under her control, the
1981 Toyota Cressida automobile, her bank accounts and savings
accounts, and her personal effects and belongings.
6.

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant is awarded any alimony

from the other.
7.

Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to secure and

maintain at normal and reasonable rates a $100,000.00 term life
insurance policy on his life, with the'Plaintiff as owner and
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with the Plaintiff named as primary, sole and exclusive
beneficiary thereon.

Defendant is ordered to forthwith obtain

said policy in the name of Plaintiff, deliver said policy to her
and make all premium payments thereon.
8.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby ordered to assume and

hold Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations:
The only mortgage payment on the Townhouse Court Apartments to
Prudential Federal Savings, the mortgage payment on Plaintiff's
condominium to Prudential Federal Savings, the mortgage payment
on the two duplexes awarded Plaintiff to MountainWest Savings and
Loan, the property taxes on the above condominium, duplexes,
Townhouse Court and lot at 6716 South 1300 East, all in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and any debts she has incurred in her own
name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter^r^i (fnK^cUi 2/?
9.

Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to assume and

hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom the following obligations:

All

debts and obligations incurred by the parties during the course
of the marriage/, all debts associated with those real properties
awarded to the Defendant, all obligations that may result from
joint tax return filings of the parties, and any debts and
obligations he has incurred in his own name since the filing of
the Complaint in this matter.
10.

Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay to

Plaintiff on or before the 2nd day of July, 1984, the sum of
$15,000.00 and an additional sum of $5,0^00.00 in six (6) months
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11.

Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to cooperate in

obtaining a Toyota automobile or automobiles for Plaintiff at the
dealer's wholesale price through the automobile dealerships owned
by Larry H. Miller.

The Plaintiff shall have the privilege of

purchasing new automobiles at the dealer's wholesale price for as
The Oeurt f&*&£

long a period of time as Defendant has this privileged
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12.

Should Defendant ever obtain any ownership or

proprietary interest in any of the entities that Defendant sold
to Larry H. Miller in November of 1981, then Plaintiff be and is
hereby awarded one-half of the Defendant's acquired interest
immediately upon receipt.
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13.

Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to replace the

roof on the duplex at 1933-37 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City,
Utah, at his sole cost and expense.

Said work is to be done by

the Defendant's work crew and at the sole cost of the Defendant
and is to be completed within sixty (60) days from the signing of
this order.
14.

Defendant be and he is hereby awarded all right, title

and interest he holds in and to the W.R.H. Construction Company,
together with all assets and liabilities associated therewith,
with the same to be free and clear of any interest of the
Plaintiff.
15.

Defendant be and he is hereby granted a right of first

refusal should the Plaintiff ever place any of the above
properties, excluding the Old Farm condominium, awarded to her
for sale, with said right to be exercised in writing within three
(3) business days of receipt of the offer of purchase from the
Plaintiff's prospective buyers.
16.

The parties be and they are each hereby restrained and

enjoined from harassing, annoying, bothering, or otherwise
harming one another in any way and at any time, with the sole
exception that they are allowed to contact one another to
complete the requirements and the transfer of properties, payment
of debts, repairs and other items as made necessary by this
order.
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17.

The verbal stipulation and property settlement

agreement of the parties is hereby approved and confirmed in all
particulars.
18.

It is hereby ordered that this Order of Distribution of

Real and Personal Property, Payment of Debts, Support, Attorney's
Fees and Other Related Matters which has this day been signed by
the Court be filed and entered Nunc Pro Tunc to be of record as
of June 20, 1984, that being the date when the judgment was
rendered herein.
19.

The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do

and perform all the matters and things required by each of them
to be done herein,
DATED AND SIGNED this

f? —flay of August, 1984 and to be

filed and entered Nunc Pro Tunc as of June 20, 1984 that being
the day the judgment could have been signed, dated, filed and
entered.
BY/TH# COURT:

?H RIGTRUP
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

i

i

H. DIXON 5-JW(>:-EY
B
RICHARD K. CRANDALL
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were served on Douglas B. Wade, attorney
for respondent, Suite 900 No. 4, Valley Tower Building, 50 West
Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, by hand delivery, on
December " V k * 1984.
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